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KEYNES  ON  INFLATION 
Not  the  least  of  inflation’s  consequences  is  the 
damage  done  to  the  reputations  of  certain  prominent 
economists.  A  case  in  point  is  John  Maynard  Keynes 
(1883-1946).  Once  highly  regarded  for  his  brilliant 
pathbreaking  analysis  of  the  causes  of  mass  unem- 
ployment  in  the  Great  Depression  of  the  1930s,  he  is 
now  given  low marks  for  his  views  on  inflation. 
Popular  folklore  has  it  that  he  was  largely  uncon- 
cerned  with  inflation  from  the  start,  that  his  subse- 
quent  preoccupation  with  unemployment  led  him  to 
ignore  it  altogether,  and  that,  as  a  result,  he  favored 
expansionary  measures  to  eliminate  unemployment 
regardless  of  their  inflationary  consequences.  Since 
his  death  in  1946  his  name  (or  at  least  the  label 
“Keynesian”)  has  been  linked  to  such  inflationist 
slogans  as  “full  employment  at  any  cost”  and  “money 
doesn’t  matter.”  It  has  also  found  an  association 
with  the  discredited  concept  of  a  stable  enduring 
trade-off  between  inflation  and  unemployment  as  well 
as  with  the  equally  discredited  notion  that  the  au- 
thorities  can  peg  interest  rates  and  real  economic 
activity  at any  desired  level  simply  by  manipulating 
the  policy  instruments  they  command.  On  the  policy 
front  his  name  is  now  popularly  identified  with  ex- 
cessive  government  spending,  mounting  budget  defi- 
cits,  inflationary  money  growth;  and,  in  Britain  at 
least,  with  the  idea  that  inflation  can  be  contained 
with  incomes  policies  and  wage-price  controls.  In  the 
textbooks,  his  views  are  caricatured  in.  the  stylized 
“Keynes  versus  the  monetarists”  manner  as  the 
opposite  of  the  anti-inflationary  views  of  the  mone- 
tarists.  Small  wonder  that  he  has  been  widely  per- 
ceived  as  an  inflationist  and  that  our  present  inflation 
is  often  described  as  the  legacy  of  Keynes.1 
The  purpose  of,  this  article,  however,  it  to  show 
that  the  foregoing  perceptions  are  wrong:  that  far 
from  being  an  inflationist,  Keynes  deplored  inflation, 
warned  repeatedly  of  its  evils,  and  recommended 
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restrictive  demand  management  policies  to  prevent 
it;  that  far  from  being  an  extreme  nonmonetarist, 
he  shared  the  monetarists’  antipathy  to  inflation, 
endorsed  their  policy  goal  of  price  stability,  and  em- 
ployed  at  least  five  monetarist  concepts  in  his  analysis 
of  inflation;  and,  finally,  that  far  from  advocating 
full  employment  at  any  cost,  he  maintained  that  even 
at  high  unemployment  rates  expansionary  aggregate 
demand  policy  must  be  curbed  to  prevent  inflation. 
More  precisely,  this  article  demonstrates  (1)  that 
Keynes  was  always  concerned  with  inflation,  (2) 
that  this  concern  motivated  hi’s  advocacy  of  anti- 
inflationary  aggregate  demand  management  policy  on 
at  least  two  occasions  (including  once  in  the  Great 
Depression  of  the  1930s),  and  (3)  that  there  are 
enough  monetarist  elements  in  his  analysis  to  qualify 
him  as  at  least  a  partial  monetarist  as  far  as  inflation 
theory  is  concerned. 
These  points  are  documented  in  the  following  para- 
graphs,  which  summarize  Keynes’  own  views  on 
inflation.  As  pertinent  now  as  they  were  when  he 
first  presented  them,  his  views  are  contained  chiefly 
in  the  following  works:  (1)  Indian  Currency  and 
Finance  (1913),  (2)  The  Economic  Consequences 
of  the  Peace  (1919),  (3)  policy  advice  given  to  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  in  February  1920,  (4) 
A  Tract  on  Monetary  Reform  (1923),  (5)  the  two- 
volume  A  Treatise on Money  (1930),  and  (6)  a 
series  of  four  newspaper  articles  published  in  The 
Times  in  early  1937,  one  year  after  the  publication 
of  his  famous  The  General  Theory  of  Employment 
Interest  and  Money  (1936).  Except  for  the  General 
Theory,  which  deals  mainly  with  unemployment  and 
will  not  be  examined  here,  these  works  are  largely 
concerned  with  the  problem  of  inflation.  They  are 
examined  in  the  order  listed  above  to  show  the  con- 
sistency  of  Keynes’  anti-inflation  attitudes  over  time. 
Early  Writings 
1 For  a  recent  expression  of  this  view  see  Buchanan  and 
Wagner  [l]  who  assert  that  “Lord  Keynes  himself”  must 
“bear  substantial  responsibility”  for  our  “apparently  per- 
manent  and  perhaps  increasing  inflation”  [1;  p.  41. 
“Without  Keynes,”  they  write,  “inflation  would  not  be 
the  clear  and  present  danger  to  the  free  society  that  it 
has  surely  now  become.  The  legacy  or  heritage  of  Lord 
Keynes  is  the  .  .  .intellectual  legitimacy  provided  to .  .  . 
deficit  spending,  inflation,  and  the  growth  of  govern- 
ment”  [1;  p.  24]. 
Keynes’  strong  aversion  to  inflation  is  evident  in 
even  his  earliest  work.  It  appears,  for  example,  in 
his  Indian  Currency  and  Finance  (1913).  There  he 
emphatically  rejects  the  argument  that  “a  depreci- 
ating  currency  is  advantageous  .  .  .  to  trade,”  con- 
tending  that  any  advantages  derived  from  inflation 
are  “only  temporary”  and  that  they  “occur  largely  at 
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and  therefore  do  “not  profit  the  country  as  a  whole” 
[ 5 ;  p.  2].  He  takes  an  even  tougher  attitude  in  his 
Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace  (1919),  con- 
demning  inflation  in  the  harshest  possible  terms. 
He  says  : 
Lenin  is  said  to  have  declared  that  the  best  way  to 
destroy  the  capitalist  system  was  to  debauch  the 
currency.  By  a  continuing  process  of  inflation, 
governments  can  confiscate,  secretly  and  unob- 
served,  an  important  part  of  the  wealth  of  their 
citizens.  By  this  method  they  not  only  confiscate, 
but  they  confiscate  arbitrarily;  and,  while  the 
process  impoverishes  many,  it  actually  enriches 
some  [6;  pp.  148-9]. 
He  agrees  with  Lenin  that  inflation  has  the  potenti- 
ality  of  destroying  the  basis  of  capitalist  society. 
Lenin  was  certainly  right.  There  is  no  subtler,  no 
surer  means  of  overturning  the  existing  basis  of 
society  than  to  debauch  the  currency.  The  process 
engages  all  the  hidden  forces  of  economic  law  on 
the  side  of  destruction,  and  does  it  in  a  manner 
which  not  one  man  in  a  million  is  able  to  diagnose 
[6;  p.  149]. 
He  then  proceeds  to  specify  at  least  four  ways  that 
rapid  inflation  works  to  weaken  the  social  fabric  and 
to  undermine  the  foundations  of  the  capitalist  free- 
market  system.  First,  unforeseen  inflation,  he  says, 
results  in  a  capricious  and  totally  “arbitrary  rear- 
rangement  of  riches”  that  violates  the  principles  of 
distributive  justice.  Besides  its  inequities,  inflation 
also  renders  business  undertakings  riskier  and  thereby 
turns  “the  process  of  wealth-getting  .  .  . into  a  gamble 
and  a  lottery.”  In  generating  risk  and  injustice,  infla- 
tion  “strikes  not  only  at  security,  but  at  confidence  in 
the  equity  of  the  existing  distribution  of  wealth”  [6; 
p.  149].  Second,  inflation  violates  long-term  arrange- 
ments  based  on  the  assumed  stability  of  the  value  of 
money.  In  so  doing,  inflation  disturbs  contracts  and 
upsets  “all  permanent  relations  between  debtors  and 
creditors,  which  form  the  ultimate  foundation  of 
capitalism”  [6;  p.  149].  Third,  inflation  generates 
social  discontent  and  directs  it  against  businessmen 
whose  windfall  profits  are  wrongly  perceived  to  be 
the  cause  rather  than  the  consequence  of  inflation. 
This  discontent  is  exploited  by  governments  which 
“being  many  of  them  . .  . reckless  . .  . as  well  as  weak, 
seek  to  direct  on  to  a  class  known  as  ‘profiteers’  the 
popular  indignation  against  the  more  obvious  conse- 
quences  of  their  vicious  methods”  [6;  p.  149].  In 
other  words,  governments  actually  responsible  for 
causing  inflation  seek  to  shift  the  blame  onto  busi- 
nessmen  who  consequently  lose  “confidence  in  their 
place  in  society”  and  become  “the  easy  victims  of 
intimidation”  by  “governments  of  their  own  making, 
and  a  Press  of  which  they  are  the  proprietors”  [6; 
p.  150].  By  making  business  a  scapegoat  and  target 
of  vilification  and  control,  inflation  reinforces  anti- 
business  attitudes  and  weakens  support  for  what 
Keynes  called  “the  active  and  constructive  element  in 
the  whole  capitalist  society”2  [6;  p.  149]. 
Finally,  inflation  tends  to  breed  such  misguided 
remedies  as  “price  regulation”  and  “profiteer- 
hunting”  that  may  do  more  damage  than  the  inflation 
itself.  Keynes  was  especially  critical  of  the  tendency 
of  governments  to  resort  to  price  controls,  which  in 
his  view  lead  to  resource  misallocation  and  a  reduced 
supply  of  goods,  thereby  compounding  inflationary 
pressures.3  Regarding  the  disincentives  to  real  out- 
put  occasioned  by  controls,  he  said  that  “the  preser- 
vation  of  a  spurious  value  for  the  currency,  by  the 
force  of  law  expressed  in  the  regulation  of  prices, 
contains  in  itself,  however,  the  seeds  of  final  eco- 
nomic  decay,  and  soon  dries  up  the  source  of  ultimate 
supply.”  For,  by  freezing  prices  at  what  are  likely 
to  be  disequilibrium  levels,  controls  constitute  “a 
system  of  compelling  the  exchange  of  commodities 
at  what  is  not  their  real  relative  value,”  and  this 
“not  only  relaxes  production  but  leads  finally  to  the 
waste  and  inefficiency  of  barter”  [6;  pp.  149-50]. 
Summarizing  the  foregoing  harmful  consequences 
of  inflation,  he  concludes  that  governments  that  allow 
inflation  to  get  out  of  control  do  irreparable  damage 
to  the  established  social  and  economic  order.  In  so 
doing  they  are  “carrying  a  step  further  the  fatal 
process  which  the  subtle  mind  of  Lenin  had  con- 
sciously  conceived.”  For, 
By  combining  a  popular  hatred  of  the  class  of 
entrepreneurs  with  the  blow  already  given  to  social 
security  by  the  violent  and  arbitrary  disturbance 
of  contract  and  of  the  established  equilibrium  of 
wealth  which  is  the  inevitable  result  of  inflation. 
these  governments  are  fast  rendering  impossible  a 
continuance  of  the  social  and  economic  order.  .  .  . 
But  they  have  no  plan  for  replacing  it  [6;  p.  150]. 
It  would  be  difficult  indeed  to  find  a  more  damning 
indictment  of  inflation  and  inflationist  policies  than 
that  presented  by  Keynes.  in  The  Economic  Conse- 
quences of  the  Peace.  Anyone  seeking  evidence  that 
he  was  an  inflationist  will  not  find  it  there  ;  on  the. 
contrary,  not  only  does  he  display  a  marked  aversion 
to  inflation,  but  he  also  sees  no  compensating  benefits 
to  offset  its  evils. 
2 Note  that  the  very  inflationary  evils  denounced  by 
Keynes  are  likewise  stressed  by  Buchanan  and  Wagner 
[l;  pp.  61-5].  This  in  a  book,  ironically  enough,  pur- 
porting  to  show  that  Keynes  was  an  inflationist. 
3 Buchanan  and  Wagner  [1 ; p.  54]  echo  Keynes’  conten- 
tion  that  the  harm  wrought  by  controls  must  be  counted 
among  the  major  costs  of  inflation. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1981 Policy  Advice  in  Early  1920 
Keynes’  concern  with  the  dangers  of  inflation  influ- 
enced  his  policy  advice  in  the  post-war  boom  of  1920 
when  an  outburst  of  inflation  threatened  the  British 
economy.*  Then  as  now  a  crucial  policy  question 
was:  What  is  the  least  costly  way  to  remove  infla- 
tion  ?  Should  it  be  done  gradually  or  swiftly  in  one 
stroke?  Keynes’  answer  was  clear  enough:  reject 
gradualism  and  use  the  monetary  shock  approach. 
Accordingly,  when  consulted  by  Austen  Chamberlain, 
the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  in  early  February 
1920,  he  unhesitatingly  recommended  “a  stiff  dose 
of  dear  money”  to  halt  the  inflation  [3;  p.  458].  He 
urged  a severely  restrictive  monetary  policy,  entailing 
a  steep  jump  in  interest  rates,  to  break  the  inflation- 
ary  boom.  Asked  to  specify  the  degree  of  monetary 
restriction  he  would  be  willing  to  tolerate  in  order 
to  end  inflation,  Keynes,  according  to  Chamberlain, 
indicated  that  “[he]  would  go  for  a  financial  crisis 
.  .  .  .  Would  go  to  whatever  rate  is  necessary  .  .  . 
and  keep  it  at  that  for  three  years”  [3;  p.  458].  In 
this  connection  Keynes  argued  that  given  the  high 
inflationary  expectations  then  prevailing,  sharp  in- 
creases  in  nominal  interest  rates  were  essential  in 
order  to  raise  the  real  interest  rate  sufficiently  to 
discourage  borrowing  and  spending  [3;  p.  463]. 
This,  he  argued,  would  not  cause  serious  unemploy- 
ment  because  there  was  a  wide  margin  of  safety 
before  business  would  be  operating  below  full  ca- 
pacity. 
Keynes’  advocacy  of  tight  money  in  this  episode 
clearly  rested  on  his  fear  of  the  damage  that  continu- 
ing  rapid  inflation  could  inflict  on  society  and  the 
capitalist  system.  He  stated  as  much  in  a  memo- 
randum  written  shortly  after  his  meeting  with  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  He  feared,  he  noted, 
that  persistent  inflation  would  generate  “social  un- 
rest”  and  “strike  at  the  whole  basis  of  contract,  of 
security,  and  of  the  capitalist  system  generally,” 
eventually  leading  to  “socialistic  control”  over  indus- 
try.  The  choice,  he  thought,  was  between  “dear 
money  or  .  .  .  socialization  of  the  supply  of  capital” 
[3;  p.  458-9].  G iven  these  alternatives,  Keynes  was 
clearly  in  favor  of  dear  money,  a  position  he  main- 
tained  for  the  rest  of  his  career.  He  acknowledged 
this  in  January  1942  when,  looking  back  at  his  earlier 
policy  advice,  he  declared  that  he  would  “give  today 
exactly  the  same  advice  that  I  gave  then,  namely  a 
4 For  the details of  Keynes’  advice  in  this  episode  see 
Howson  [3].  All  references  in  this  section  are  to  How- 
son,  who  reproduces  the  relevant  passages  from  Keynes’ 
papers. 
swift  and  severe  dose  of  dear  money,  sufficient  to 
break  the  market,  and  quick  enough  to  prevent  at 
least  some  of  the  disastrous  consequences  that  would 
otherwise  ensue”  [3;  p.  462].  Keynes’  1942  state- 
ment  suggests  that  even  the  intervening  years  of  the 
Great  Depression  of  the  1930s  had  not  lessened  his 
concern  about  the  dangers  of  inflation,  dangers  that 
he  had  described  earlier  in  his  1923  A  Tract  on 
Monetary  Reform. 
A  Tract  on  Monetary  Reform  (1923) 
Nowhere  does  Keynes  express  his  concern  for  in- 
flation  more  strongly  than  in  the  Tract.  There  his 
chief  fear  is  that  inflation  may  retard  capital  forma- 
tion  and  inhibit  long-term  economic  growth.  He 
specifies  at  least  three  ways  that  this  can  happen. 
He  notes  first  the  inflationary  disincentive  to  saving. 
By  eroding  the  real  value  of  past  savings,  inflation 
diminishes  “the  capacity  of  the  investing  class  to 
save”  and  destroys  “the  atmosphere  of  confidence 
which  is  a  condition  of  the  willingness  to  save”  [7; 
p.  29].  With  a  smaller  portion  of  national  income 
flowing  into  saving  and  investment,  the  rate  of 
capital  accumulation  falls.  And  since,  according  to 
Keynes,  “the  national  capital  must  grow  as  fast  as 
the  national  labor  supply”  for  “the  maintenance  of 
the  same  standard  of  life,”  it  follows  that  a  fall  in 
capital  growth  below  the  required  proportional  rate 
will  lower  living  standards  [7;  p.  29].  In  short,  by 
discouraging  saving  and  capital  formation,  inflation 
may  cause  a  fall  in  the  aggregate  capital/labor  ratio 
(i.e.,  the  amount  of  capital  each  laborer  has  to  work 
with)  and  a corresponding  drop  in  labor  productivity 
and  output  per  capita. 
A  second  factor  retarding  capital  accumulation 
is  the  undercharging  of  depreciation  during  infla- 
tion  and  the  consequent  inadequate  provision  for 
the  replacement  of  worn-out  capital.  This  occurs 
because  depreciation  charges  on  capital  equipment 
are  computed  on  the  basis  of  original  (historical) 
cost  rather  than  replacement  costs.  These  replace- 
ment  costs  rise  with  inflation.  Thus  when  prices  rise 
the  depreciation  charges  calculated  on  the  basis  of 
original  cost  are  too  small  to  replace  the  worn-out 
capital.  The  result  may  be  an  unintended  depletion  of 
the  capital  stock.  “In  such  conditions,”  said  Keynes, 
a  country  “can  even  trench  on  existing  capital  or  fail 
to  make  good  its  current  depreciation.”  For  it  “is 
one  of  the  evils  of  a  depreciating  currency  that  it 
enables  a  community  to  live  on  its  capital  unawares, 
The  increasing  money  value  of  the  community’s 
capital  goods  obscures  temporarily  a  diminution  in 
the  real  quantity  of  the  stock”  [7;  pp.  27-8]. 
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noted,  is  the  increased  business  risk  resulting  from 
inflation.  For  inflation  adds  to  ordinary  business 
risk  the  extra  “risk  directly  arising  out  of  instability 
in  the  value  of  money”  [7;  p.  33].  To  compensate 
for  this  extra  risk,  businessmen  add  a  risk  premium 
to  the  rate  at  which  they  discount  the  future,  and  the 
higher  discount  rate  discourages  investment. 
The  discouraging  effects  of  inflation  on  saving,  in- 
vestment,  and  growth  were  not  the  only  inflationary 
evils  described  by  Keynes  in  the  Tract.  Others  in- 
cluded  (1)  the  injustice  and  inequity  resulting  from 
inflationary  redistributions  of  income  and  wealth, 
(2)  the  resort  to  spurious  inflation  remedies-e.g., 
price  controls,  excess  profits  taxes,  profiteer-hunting 
and  the  like-remedies  that  constitute  “not  the  least 
part  of  the  evils,”  often  doing  more  harm  than  the 
inflation  they  are  designed  to  cure,  and  (3)  the  social 
resentment  and  discontent  produced  by  inflation. 
This  resentment,  when  directed  against  the  business 
class  whose  windfall  profits  are  wrongly  perceived 
as  the  cause  rather  than  the  consequence  of  inflation, 
works  to  discredit  enterprise  and  to  weaken  support 
for  the  productive  element  of  society-“the  prop  of 
society  and  the  builder  of  the  future”  [7;  p.  24]. 
Having  discussed  the  adverse  effects  of  inflation  on 
capital  formation,  economic  growth,  distributive 
justice,  and  social  stability,  respectively,  Keynes  next 
considers  the  alleged  beneficial  output  effects  of  in- 
flation.  He  notes  that  unanticipated  inflation  may 
temporarily  stimulate  economic  activity  by  raising 
profits  and  profit  expectations.  Profits  rise,  he  said, 
because  wages  and  other  costs  lag  behind  rising 
prices  during  inflation.  And  with  nominal  wages 
lagging  behind  prices,  real  wages  fall,  thus  inducing 
producers  to  step  up  their  employment  of  labor. 
Likewise,  the  lagged  adjustment  of  market  interest 
rates  to  inflation  and  the  consequent  fall  in  the  real 
cost  of  borrowing  leads  producers  to  expand  their 
operations.  Finally,  inflation  reduces  the  real  burden 
of  fixed  charges,  thereby  giving  a  temporary  fillip  to 
profits  and  to  economic  activity.  But  Keynes  in- 
sisted  that  any  such  stimulus  would  most  likely  be 
small  and  short-lived.  Moreover  it  would  constitute 
an  undesirable  “overstimulation  of  industrial  activ- 
ity”  requiring  undue  strain  on  capacity  and  a  corre- 
sponding  “over-exertion”  of  labor  [7;  p.  36].  For 
these  reasons  he  judged  the  overall  benefits  to  be 
minimal. 
Consequently,  when  Keynes  weighed  the  benefits  of 
inflation  against  the  evils,  he  found  the  latter  to  far 
outweigh  the  former  and  accordingly  came  down 
heavily  in  favor  of  price  stability.  He  summarized  his 
case for  price  stability  best  when  he  declared  that,  be- 
cause  “inflation  is  unjust  and  deflation  is  inexpedient 
. .  . , both  are  evils  to  be  shunned.  The  individualistic 
capitalism  of  today,  precisely  because  it  entrusts  sav- 
ing  to  the  individual  investor  and  production  to  the 
individual  employer,  presumes  a  stable  measuring- 
rod  of  value,  and  cannot  be  efficient-perhaps  can- 
not  survive-without  one”  [7;  p.  36].  It  follows, 
he  said,  that  the  government  should  make  price  sta- 
bility  its  primary  policy  goal.  For,  “if  we  are  to 
continue  to  draw  the  voluntary  savings  of  the  com- 
munity  into  ‘investments,’  we  must  make  it  a  prime 
object  of  deliberate  State  policy  that  the  standard  of 
value,  in  terms  of  which  they  are  expressed,  should 
be  kept  stable”  [7;  p.  16].  These  are  hardly  the 
sentiments  of  an  inflationist.  On  the  contrary,  they 
are  an  indication  of  Keynes’  hard-line  antipathy  to 
inflation  and  his  belief  in  the  absolute  necessity  of 
price  level  stability. 
Monetarist  Aspects  of  the  Tract 
The  analysis  of  inflation  contained  in  the  Tract  has 
much  in  common  with  the  position  taken  by  today’s 
monetarists.  Specifically,  inflation  is  discussed  with- 
in  the  context  of  an  analytical-  model  that  is  remark- 
ably  monetarist  in  spirit,  embodying  such  standard 
monetarist  ingredients  as  (1)  the  quantity  theory  of 
money,  (2)  the  concept  of  inflation  as  a  tax  on  real 
money  balances,  (3)  the  monetary  approach  to  ex- 
change  rate  determination,  and  (4)  the  Fisherian 
distinction  between  real  and  nominal  interest  rates. 
The  paragraphs  below  summarize  Keynes’  views  on 
these  elements  in  order  to  demonstrate  that  he  was 
not  the  stereotype  nonmonetarist  caricature  of  the 
textbooks. 
Quantity  Theory  of  Money 
The  Keynes  of  the  Tract  was  an  unequivocal  ad- 
herent  of  the  quantity  theory.  “This  theory,”  he  said, 
“is  fundamental.  Its  correspondence  with  fact  is  not 
open  to  question”  [7;  p.  61].  His  own  version  of  the 
theory  as  elucidated  in  the  Tract  is  essentially  the 
same  as  the  modern  monetarist  version  and  embodies 
the  following  monetarist  elements  : 
(1)  a  money  supply  and  demand  theory  of  price 
level  determination, 
(2)  the notion  of  money  stock exogeneity,  implying 
money-to-price  causality, 
(3)  the  concept  of  the  demand  for  money  as  a 
stable  function  of  a  few  key  variables,  and 
(4)  a  focus  on  the  special  role  of  price  expecta- 
tions  in  the money  demand  function. 
Regarding  the  money  supply  and  demand  theory  of 
the  price  level,  he  said  that  “two  elements”  determine 
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quantity,  present  and  prospective,  of  [money]  in 
circulation.  Second,  the  amount  of  purchasing  power 
which  it  suits  the  public  to  hold  in  that  shape”  [7; 
p.  xviii].  Elsewhere  in  the  Tract  he  says  that  the 
price  level  “depends  on  the  currency  policy.  of  the 
government  and  the  currency  habits  of  the  people,  in 
accordance  with  the  quantity  theory  of  money”  [7; 
p.  71]. 
Having  declared  that  general  prices  -depend  on 
money  supply  and  demand,  he  next  presented  the 
quantity  theory  in  the  form  of  the  equation  P  = 
M/D  or  M/P  =  D,  which  says  that  the  price  level, 
P,  adjusts  to  equate  the  real  (price-deflated)  value  of 
the  given  nominal  money  stock,  M,  with  the  public’s 
real  demand  for  it,  D.5  He  then  proceeded  to  analyze 
the  variables  of  the  foregoing  equation.  Regarding  the 
nominal  money  stock,  M,  he  said  that  it  is  an  exoge- 
nous  variable  controllable  by  the  central  bank  such 
that  causation  runs  from  money  to  prices  rather  than 
vice-versa  as  claimed  by  some  believers  in  a  passive, 
demand-determined  money  stock.  -The  money  supply, 
Keynes  declared,  is  “under  the  control  (or  ought  to 
be)  of  the  central  banking  authorities”  who  thus 
possess  the  means  to  stabilize  prices  [7;  p.  68]. 
With  respect  to  the  equation’s  money  demand  com- 
ponent,  D,  Keynes  stated  that  it  is  determined  by 
several  underlying  factors  including  (1)  “wealth,” 
(2)  “habits,”  (3)  interest  rates  (“the  estimated  ad- 
vantages  of  keeping  more  cash  on  hand  compared 
with  those  of  .  .  .  investing  it”),  and  (4)  expected 
inflation  (“the  trust  or  distrust  which  the  public 
feel  in  the  prospect  of  the  future  value”  of  the  cur- 
rency)  [7;  pp.  62,  64,  xviii].  Here  is  the  monetarist 
notion  of  the  demand  for  money  as  a  stable  function 
of  a  few  key  variables. 
both  directly  and  also  indirectly  through  the  price 
expectations  variable  in  the.  money  demand  function. 
The  indirect  effect  magnifies  the  initial  impact  of 
money  growth  on  inflation,.  causing  prices  to  rise 
faster  than  the  money  stock  itself.  In  his  own words, 
“a  change  in  [the  money  stock]  due  to  causes  which 
set  up  a  general  expectation  of  a  further  [inflation- 
ary]  change  in  the  same  direction,  may  produce  a 
more  than  proportionate  effect  on  [prices]”  [7;  p. 
66].  Prices  outstrip  money,  he  said,  because  infla- 
tionary  money  growth,  by  generating  expectations  of 
future  inflation  and  thereby,  raising  the  anticipated 
depreciation  cost  of  holding  money,  reduces  the 
demand  for  real  cash  balances  and  stimulates  a 
corresponding  rise  in  money  turnover.  This  expec- 
tations-induced  rise  in  the  circulation  velocity  of 
money  puts  additional  upward  pressure  on  prices, 
thus  magnifying  the  impact  of  money  growth  on 
inflation. 
Keynes  pointed  out  that  this  sequence  of  events  had 
actually  occurred  in  the  German  hyperinflation  of 
1922-1923  when  prices  rose  faster  than  the  nominal 
money  stock.  He  also  noted  that  the  same  sequence 
of  events  explained  the  perplexing  fall  in  the  real  or 
price-deflated  money  stock  that  had  puzzled  German 
observers  at  the  time.  That  is,  he  said  that  the  ex- 
pectations-induced  flight  from  cash  and  the  corre- 
sponding  rise  in  velocity  had  caused  prices  in  Ger- 
many  to  rise  faster  than  the  nominal  money  stock 
thereby  producing  the  observed  shrinkage  of  the  real 
or  price-deflated  money  stock.  Conversely,  he  noted 
that  expectations  of  slower  money  growth  that  reduce 
the  public’s  “degree  of  .  .  .  distrust  of  the  future 
value  of  the  money”  will  “lead  to  some  increases  in 
their  use  of  it”  resulting  in  a  rise  in  the  real  money 
stock  [7  ;  p.  47]. 
Of  these  four  variables  Keynes  paid  particular  at- 
tention  to  the  expected  rate  of  inflation,  pointing  out 
that  its  inclusion  in  ‘the  money  demand  function 
means  that  money  demand  is  not  completely  inde- 
pendent  of  money  supply.  For,  according  to  him, 
rapid  increases  in  money  supply  may  generate  expec- 
tations  of  future  inflation  (expectations  that  consti- 
tute  the  anticipated  depreciation  cost  of  holding 
money)  and  thereby  lower  real  money  demand.  This, 
he  noted,  implies  that  money  growth  affects  prices 
5 Keynes  [7;  p.  63]  employed  a  slightly  different  nota- 
tion,  writing  the  equation  as  n=pk,  where  n  denotes  the 
nominal  money  stock,  p  the  price  level,  and  k  the  quan- 
tity  of  real  cash  balances  people  desire  to  hold.  He  also 
presents  a  more  elaborate  version  of  the  equation,  namely 
n=p(k+rk'),  where  k  and  k’  denote  real  cash  balances 
held  by  the  public  in  the-form  of  currency  and  checking 
deposits,  respectively,  and  r  is  the  ratio  of  cash  reserves 
that  banks  hold  behind  their  deposit  liabilities. 
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Finally,  Keynes  employed  the  quantity  theory  in  his 
policy  analysis,  arguing  (1)  that  inflation  is  caused 
by  an  excess  supply  of  money,  (2)  that  such  mone- 
tary  excess  could  stem  from  falls  in  money  demand 
as  well  as  from  rises  in  money  supply,  (3)  that  the 
central  bank  possesses  the  power  to  prevent  the  latter 
and  counteract  the  former,  and  (4)  that  it  should 
employ  this  power  to  stabilize  prices.  For  price  sta- 
bility  he  recommended  deliberate  countercyclical 
movements  in  the  money  supply  to  offset  or  nullify 
the  procyclical  impact  of  changes  in  money  demand 
on  prices.  He  thought  that  real  money  demand 
fluctuated  with  the  state  of business  confidence,  fall- 
ing  in  booms,  rising  in  slumps,  and  thereby  amplify- 
ing  cyclical  movements  of  prices.  “The  characteristic 
of  the  ‘credit  cycle’,”  he  said,  “consists  in  a  tendency 
of  [real  cash  balances]  to  diminish  during  the  boom 
and  increase  during  the  depression”  [7;  p.  67].  To counteract  these  he  advocated  deliberate  monetary 
contraction  in  booms  and  monetary  expansion  in 
slumps.  “The  time  to  deflate  the  supply  of  cash,”  he 
said,  “is  when  real  balances  are  falling  .  .  .  and  .  .  . 
the  time  to  inflate  the  supply  of  cash  is  when  real 
balances  are  rising,  and  not,  as  seems  to  be  our 
present  practice,  the  other  way  round”  [7;  p.  149]. 
In  so  stating,  he  rejected  the  monetarist  case  for  a 
fixed  monetary  growth  rate  rule  (which  he  argued 
“is  bound  to  lead  to  unsteadiness  of  the  price  level” 
when  money  demand  fluctuates)  in  favor  of  discre- 
tionary  monetary  management  [7;  p.  69].  “In  the 
modern  world  of  paper  currency  and  bank  credit,” 
he  declared,  “there  is  no  escape  from  a  ‘managed’ 
currency”  [7;  p.  136].  Note,  however,  that  while  he 
rejected  the  monetarist  case  for  rules  instead  of  dis- 
cretion  in  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy,  he  did 
voice  the  modern  monetarist  complaint  that  discre- 
tionary  monetary  movements  frequently  tend  to  be 
procyclical  rather  than  count&cyclical.  That  is,  he 
complained  that  the  British  monetary  authorities  had 
perversely  engineered  monetary  expansions  in  booms 
when  money  demand  was  falling  and  monetary  con- 
traction  in  slumps  when  money  demand  was  rising 
thereby  aggravating  rather  than  mitigating  inflation 
and  deflation.  These  -policy  errors  notwithstanding, 
however,  he  remained  a  strong  advocate  of  discre- 
tionary  monetary  intervention  in  the  pursuit  of  price 
stability. 
Inflation  as  a  Tax  on  Real  Money  Balances 
The  second  monetarist  ingredient  that  Keynes 
enunciates  in  the  Tract  is  the  concept  of  inflation  as  a 
tax  on  real  money  balances.  As  noted  by  the  late 
Harry  Johnson,  this  inflation  tax  analysis  constitutes 
an  essential  part  of  the  quantity  theory  approach  to 
inflation.  Consistent  with  that  approach,  Keynes 
argues  that  inflation  is  “a  method  of  taxation”  which 
the  government  uses  to  “secure  the  command  over 
real  resources,  resources  just  as  real  as  those  ob- 
tained  by  [ordinary]  taxation”  [7; p.  37].  “What  is 
raised  by  printing  notes,”  he  writes,  “is  just  as  much 
taken  from  the  public  as  is  a  beer  duty  or  an  income 
tax”  [7;  p.  52].  Regarding  the  inflation  tax  he  says 
that  “a  government  can  live  by  this  means  when  it 
can  live  by  no  other.  It  is  the  form  of  taxation  which 
the  public  find  hardest  to  evade  and  even  the  weakest 
government  can  enforce,  when  it  can’  enforce  nothing 
else”  [7;  p.  37]. 
In  discussing  the  inflation  tax,  Keynes  stresses  that 
it  is  a  tax on  cash  balances.  The  burden  of  the  tax, 
he  says,  falls  on  cashholders,  i.e., 
on  the  holders  of  the  original  .  .  .  notes,  whose 
notes  [after  inflation]  are  worth  .  .  .  less  than 
they  were  before.  The  inflation  has  amounted  to 
a  tax  .  .  .  on  all  holders  of  notes  in  proportion  to 
their  holdings.  The  burden’  of  the  tax  is  well 
spread,  cannot  be  evaded,  costs  nothing  to  collect, 
and  falls,  in  a  rough  sort  of  way,  in  proportion  to 
the  wealth  of  the  victim.  No  wonder  its  super- 
ficial  advantages  have  attracted  Ministers  of  Fi- 
nance  [7;  p.  39]. 
He  next  explains  how  inflationary  money  creation 
transfers  rear  resources  from  cashholders  to  the  gov- 
ernment.  He  notes  that  a  given,  say,  25 percent  in- 
flation  rate  requires  an  equivalent  rate  of  rise  of  cash 
holdings  just  to  maintain  real  money  balances  at 
desired  levels.  To  accomplish  this,  cashholders  cut 
expenditures  on  goods  and  services  and  add  the  un- 
spent  proceeds  to  money  balances.  The  reduced 
private  outlay  for  goods  and  services  releases  re- 
sources  which  the  government  acquires  with  newly 
issued  money  that  is  then  added  to  private  cash  bal- 
ances.  In  this  way  inflation  enables  the  government 
to  appropriate  real  resources  from  cashholders  just 
as  surely  as  if  it  had  taken  part  of  their  earlier  money 
balances  and  spent  the  proceeds  on  goods  and  ser- 
vices.  How  much  the  government  gets  depends  upon 
the  quantity  of  real  balances  the  public  wishes  to 
hold  when  the  inflation  rate  is  2.5 percent.  Assuming 
the  public  desires  real  balances  totaling  $36  million, 
the  government’s  tax  take  is  25  percent  of  that  sum 
or  $9  million.  Or,  as  Keynes  himself  put  it  in  dis- 
cussing  the  effects  of  the  hypothetical  25  percent 
inflation  tax  on  real  balances  of  $36  million,  “by  ‘the 
process  of  printing  the  additional  notes  the  govern- 
ment  has  transferred  to  itself  an  amount  equal  to 
$9  million,  just  as  successfully  as  if  it  had  raised  this 
sum  in  taxation”  [7 ;  p.  39]. 
Keynes’  discussion  of  the  inflation  tax  includes  a 
sophisticated  analysis  of  the  optimal  rate  of  inflation 
from  the  point  of  view  of  maximizing  tax  revenue. 
In  this  connection  he  makes  four  points.  First,  from 
the  formula  that  tax  yield  equals  tax  rate  times  tax 
base,  it  follows  that  the  yield  of  the  inflation  tax  is 
the  multiplicative  product  of  the  inflation  rate  (tax 
rate)  and  real  cash  balances  (tax  base),  respectively. 
Second,  the  tax  base  is  not  invariant  to  the  tax  rate 
but  falls  when  the  latter  rises.  That  is,  when  the 
government  raises  the  tax  rate  the  tax  base  tends  to 
shrink  as  people  seek  to  avoid  the  inflation  tax  by 
changing  their  habits  and  economizing  on  real  money 
holdings.  Were  this  not  so,  said  Keynes,  “there 
would  be  no  limit  to  the  sums  which  the  government 
could  extract  from  the  public  by  means  of  inflation” 
[7; p.  42].  Third,  because  the tax  base  shrinks  with 
rises  in  the  tax  rate,  the  government  will  realize 
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less-than-proportionate  fall  in  the  base.  “A’  govern- 
ment  has  to  remember,”  he  said,  “that  even  if  a  tax 
is  not  prohibitive  it may  be  unprofitable,  and  that  a 
medium,  rather  than  an  extreme,  imposition  will 
yield  the  greatest  gain”  [7  ; p.  43].  Fourth,  it  follows 
that  there  is  one  inflation  rate  that  maximizes  tax 
revenue  and  that  occurs  where’  the  percentage  in- 
crease  in  the  tax  rate  equals  the  percentage  shrinkage 
in  the  tax  base,  i.e.,  where  the  elasticity  of  real  money 
demand  with  respect  to  the  inflation  rate  is  unity. 
Here  is  the  concept  of  the  tax-maximizing  rate  of 
inflation,  that  plays  such  a  key  role  in  the  modern 
monetarist  analysis  of  inflationary  finance. 
Monetary  Approach  to  Exchange  Rates 
A  third  monetarist  concept  used.  by  Keynes  in  the 
Tract  was  the  monetary  approach  to  exchange  rate 
analysis.  This  approach  rests  on  the  view  that  the 
exchange  rate  between  two  national’  currencies  is 
determined  by  the  respective  national  money  supplies 
and  demands  in  the  two  countries  and  the  resulting 
effects  on  their  respective  general  price  levels.  Re- 
garding  the  monetary  approach,  Keynes  said  that  the 
foreign  exchanges  “depend  .  .  .  on  the  relative  price 
levels  established  here  and  abroad  by  the  respective 
credit  [i.e.,  monetary]  policies  adopted  here  and 
abroad”  [7;  p.  146].  He  reached  this  conclusion  by 
combining  the  quantity  theory  of  money  with  the 
purchasing  power  parity  theory  of  exchange  rates. 
The  quantity  theory  of  course  says  that  the  general 
price  level.  is  determined  by  the  demand-adjusted 
money  stock,  i.e.,  by  the  nominal  stock  of  money  per 
unit  of  real  money  demand.  And  the  purchasing 
power  parity  doctrine,  he  explained,  holds  that  the 
exchange  rate  tends  to  equal  the  ratio  of  the  price 
levels  in  the  two  countries  concerned.  Taken  to- 
gether,  the  quantity  theory  and  the  purchasing  power 
parity  doctrine  imply  that  the  exchange  rate  is  deter- 
mined  by  relative  demand-adjusted  money  stocks 
operating  through  relative  national  price  levels.6 
From  the  foregoing  Keynes  concluded  that  if  both 
countries  inflate  their  currencies  at  the  same  rate  the 
6 Note  that  this  version  of  the  monetary  annroach  ignores 
certain  nonmonetary  determinants  of  exchange  rates, 
namely  (1)  the  real  terms  of  trade  and  (2)  the  relative 
prices  of  traded  and  nontraded  goods,  respectively.  As 
pointed  out  by  Keynes,  these  factors  may  be  safely  dis- 
regarded  only  when  the  source  of  exchange  rate  distur- 
bance  is  of  a  predominantly  monetary  origin.  Regarding 
such  monetary  shocks,  he  argues  that  they  have  in  fact 
“been  so  dominant  in  their  influence  that  the  theory  has 
been  actually  applicable  with  remarkable  accuracy”  [7; 
p.  82]. 
exchange  rate  will  stabilize,  whereas  if  they  inflate  at 
different  rates  the  exchange  rate  will  appreciate  in 
favor  of  the  country  with  the  lower  inflation  rate  and 
depreciate  against  the  country  with  the  higher  infla- 
tion  rate.7  He  also  concluded  that  floating  exchange 
rates  insulate  a  country  from  inflationary  movements 
developing  abroad.  That  is,  he  contended  that,  under 
floating  exchange  rates  an  inflationary  rise  in  foreign 
prices  would  be  offset  by an  equal  and  opposite  fall 
in  the  exchange  rate  leaving  the  domestic  currency 
price  of  foreign  goods  unchanged.  For  this  reason 
he  believed  that  floating  exchange,  rates  were  an 
absolute  necessity  for  any  country  trying  to  achieve 
domestic  price  stability  via  the  operation  of  domestic 
monetary  policy.  With  respect  to  his  analysis  of 
exchange  rates,  the  Keynes  of  the  Tract  belongs  in 
today’s  monetarist  camp. 
Nominal  versus  Real  Interest  Rates 
Finally,  ‘Keynes  employed  in  the  Tract  the  mone- 
tarist  or  Fisherian  distinction  between  nominal  and 
real  interest  rates,  i.e.,  between  the  interest  rate  actu- 
ally  charged  on  loans  and  the  inflation-corrected  level 
of  that  rate.  With  respect  to  the  two  rates  he  stated 
the  following  points.  First,  for  any  given  nominal 
rate,  inflation  reduces  the  real  rate  below  the  nominal 
rate.  The  real  rate  falls  relative  to  the  nominal  rate 
because  borrowers  can  repay  their  loans  in  depreci- 
ated  dollars,  i.e.,  in  money  whose  real  purchasing 
power  is  less  than  the  amount  originally  borrowed. 
Second,  the  nominal  rate  embodies  expected  inflation 
which  may  temporarily  lag  behind  actual  inflation 
resulting  in  incomplete  adjustment  of  the  nominal 
rate. 
Third,  if  the  nominal  rate  does  not  fully  reflect 
rising  prices,  then  even  high  market  rates  may  trans- 
late  into  low  or  negative  real  rates  after  correction  for 
inflation.  As  Keynes  himself  expressed  it, 
in  a  period  of  rapidly  changing  prices,  the  money 
rate  of  interest  seldom  adjusts  itself  adequately 
or  fast  enough  to  prevent  the  real  rate  from 
becoming  abnormal  [7;  p. 20].  Thus,  when  prices 
are  rising,  the  businessman  who  borrows  money 
is  able  to  repay  the  lender  with  what,  in  terms  of 
real  value,  not  only  represents  no  interest,  but  is 
even  less  than  the  capital  originally  advanced; 
that  is,  the  real  rate  of  interest  falls  to  a  negative 
value,  and  the  borrower  reaps  a  corresponding 
benefit  [7;  pp.  19-20]. 
7 In  his  words,  “the  rate  of  exchange  can  be  improved  in 
favour  of  one  of  the  countries  by  a  financial  policy 
directed  towards  a  lowering  of  its  internal’  price  level 
relatively  to  the  internal  price  level  of  the  other  country” 
[7;  p.  88]. 
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to  borrowers  nor  a deterrent  to  borrowing  and  spend- 
ing.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  a  bargain  to  borrow- 
ers  and,  at  least  temporarily,  a  stimulus  to  economic 
activity.  The  contention  that  high  nominal  interest 
rates  may  correspond  to  low  or  negative  real  rates 
during  periods  of  rapid  inflation  and,  therefore,  may 
fail  to  discourage  borrowing  and  spending,  underlies 
the  modern  monetarist  argument  that  nominal  rates 
themselves  are  an  unreliable  indicator  of  the  degree 
of  monetary  ease  or  tightness. 
Fourth,  nominal  rates  tend  to  be  bidded  up by  eager 
borrowers  during  periods  of  inflation,  implying  that 
high  market  interest  rates  are  a  result  not  a  cause  of 
rising  prices.  “It  is  for  this  reason,”  said  Keynes, 
“that  a  high  bank  rate  should  be  associated  with  a 
period  of  rising  prices,  and  a  low  bank  rate  with  a 
period  of  falling  prices”  [7;  p.  20].  Fifth,  in  the 
long  run  nominal  rates  tend  to’ fully  adjust  for  infla- 
tion  and  the  real  rate  returns  to  its  preexisting  equi- 
librium  level.  “The  apparent  abnormality  of  the 
money  [nominal]  rate  of  interest  at  such  times  [i.e., 
in  periods  of  rapid  inflation],”  said  Keynes,  “is 
merely  the  other  side  of  the  attempt  of  the  real  rate 
to  steady  itself”  [7  ;  p.  20]. 
In  stating  these  points,  Keynes  closely  followed 
Irving  Fisher,  perhaps  the  leading  monetarist  of  the 
time.  In  fact,  considering  all  the  monetarist  elements 
in  the  Tract,  it  is  hard  to  escape  the  conclusion  that, 
in  the  1920s  at  least,  Keynes  was  largely  a  monetarist 
in  his  analysis  of  inflation.  It  is  hard  to  reconcile  the 
Keynes  of  the  Tract  with  the  stereotype  nonmone- 
tarist  Keynes  of  the  modern  textbooks.  It  is  even 
harder  to  square  the  Keynes  of  the  Tract  with  the 
caricature  of  him  as  an  out-and-out  inflationist.  For 
as  shown  above,  throughout  the  Tract  he  was  ex- 
tremely  hostile  toward  inflation,  deploring  its  evils, 
minimizing  its  benefits,  and  calling  for  its  quick 
removal. 
Nor  did  he  change  his  mind  in  his  A  Treatise  on 
Money  (1930).  To  be  sure,  there  he  tentatively  ad- 
vances  a  theory  of  inflation-induced  growth  and  even 
conjectures  that  mild  gentle  inflation  may  have  con- 
tributed  to  the  industrialization  of  the  West.  But 
his  basic  stance  is  unmistakably  that  of  an  anti- 
inflationist  and  he  still  comes  down  strongly  in  favor 
of  absolute  price  stability  as  the  ideal  policy  goal. 
A  Treatise  on  Money  (1930) 
If  the  Tract  is  famous  for  its  quantity  theory- 
inflation  tax  analysis,  the  Treatise  is  equally  famous 
for  its  celebrated  “fundamental  equations  of  prices” 
and  the  corresponding  distinction  between  income  in- 
flation  and  profit  inflation.8  Constituting  the  central 
analytical  core  of  the  Treatise,  the  fundamental  equa- 
tions  express  price  level  increases  as  the  sum  of  two 
components,  namely  (1)  increases  in  profit  per  unit 
of  output,  and  (2)  increases  in  unit  costs  of  produc- 
tion  (chiefly  labor  costs).  Of  these  two  components  of 
price  change-namely  changes  in  profit  and  changes 
in  costs,  respectively-Keynes  labels  the  former 
“profit  inflation”  and  the  latter  “income  inflation.” 
Profit  inflation  occurs  when  prices  are  outrunning 
costs,  leaving  a  large  and  growing  margin  for  profit. 
By  contrast,  income  inflation  occurs  when  wages  are 
rising  as  fast  as  prices  thereby  preventing  profit 
growth. 
It  should  be  noted  that  Keynes’  income  inflation 
does  not  correspond  to  what  today  is  called  cost- 
push  inflation,  i.e.,  an  exogenous  rise  in  wages  and 
hence  prices  caused,  for  example,  by  the  exercise  of 
trade  union  monopoly  power.  Rather  it  is  the  in- 
duced  endogenous  result  of  an  increased  demand  for 
labor  and  other  resources  generated  by  prior  profit 
inflation.9  For,  according  to  Keynes,  most  income 
inflations  do  not  stem  from  autonomous  (“spontane- 
ous”)  increases  in  wages  caused  by  “the  powers  and 
activities  of  trade  unions”  [8,  p.  151].  Instead  they 
stem  from  profit-induced  rises  in  the  demand  for 
(and  hence  prices  of).  labor  and  other  factor  re- 
sources.  That  is,  a  profit  inflation.  stimulates  firms 
to  expand  output  and  hence  their  demand  for  fac- 
tors  of  production.  This  leads,  to  a  bidding  up  of 
factor  prices  that  raises  production  costs  and  gener- 
ates  income  inflation.  This  process  continues  until 
wages  and  other  factor  prices  rise  sufficiently  to 
eliminate  excess  profits.10  Seen  this  way,  income 
inflations.  possess  three  distinctive  features.  They 
occur  at  the  expense  of  profit  inflations,  eventually 
annihilating  the  latter.  They  need  not  cause  a  rise  in 
prices  since  they  are  largely  offset  by  compensating 
falls  in  profit  inflation.  Finally,  they  are  a crucial  part 
of  the  process  that  transforms  inflation-engendered 
profits  into  costs  and  thereby  terminates  the.  tem- 
porary  stimulus  to  economic  activity. 
Having  developed  the  distinction  between  profit  and 
income  inflation,  Keynes  used  it  to  analyze  the  effect 
of  inflation  on  output  and  economic  growth.  Regard- 
ing  these  effects  he  reached  two  main  conclusions. 
8 For  a  recent  exposition  of  the  “fundamental  equations” 
and  the  corresponding  concepts  of  income  and  profit 
inflation,  see  Patinkin  [11;  pp.  33-8].  What  follows 
draws  heavily  from  Patinkin. 
9 This  point  is  stressed  by  Patinkin  [11;  p.  37]. 
10 See  Keynes  [8;  pp.  241-2]  and  Patinkin  [11;  pp.  37, 
45]. 
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output  and  growth.  “It  is  the  teaching  of  this  treat- 
ise,”  he  said,  “that  the  wealth  of  nations  is  enriched, 
not  during  income  inflations,  but  during  profit  infla- 
tions  .  .  .  at  times,  that  is  to  say,  when  prices  are 
running  away  from  costs”  [9;  p.  137].  More  pre- 
cisely,  profit  inflation  stimulates  both  current  and 
long-term  real  output.  It  stimulates  current  output 
by  raising  prices  relative  to  wages  thus  lowering  real 
wages  and  increasing  employment.  And  it  stimulates 
long-term  real  output  by  shifting  income  from  wages 
to  profit  thereby  permitting  faster  capital  accumula- 
tion  and  a  higher  rate  of  economic  growth.  In  short, 
the  effects  of  profit  inflation  include  “the  spirit  of 
buoyancy  and  enterprise  and  the  good  employment 
which  are  engendered;  but  mainly  the-  rapid  growth 
of  capital  wealth  and  the  benefits  obtained  from  this 
in  succeeding  years”  [9;  p.  144].  These  benefits, 
however,  are  possible  only  when  prices  are  outrun- 
ning  costs,  leaving  a  substantial  margin  of  profit  to 
finance  investment  and  growth.  They  cannot  occur 
in  income  inflations  where  wages  rise  as  fast  as  prices 
and  thus  annihilate  the  very  profits.  that  constitute 
both  the  means  and  the  inducement  to  economic 
growth.  It  follows  that  income  inflation,  unlike  profit 
inflation,  is  incapable  of  enhancing  growth. 
Second,  what  matters  for  investment  and  growth  is 
how  long  it  takes  for  profit  inflation  to  give  way  to 
income  inflation,  and  this  depends  on  the  speed  of 
adjustment  of  wages  to  prices.  If  the  interval  is 
short  and  wages  adjust  rapidly  to  prices,  then  infla- 
tion  will  have  little  or  no  impact  on  capital  formation 
and  growth.  But  if  the  interval  is  long  and  wages 
adjust  slowly  to  prices,  then  the  stimulus  may  be 
considerable  and  profit  inflation,  in  Keynes’  own 
words,  becomes  “a  most  potent  instrument  for  the  in- 
crease  of  accumulated  wealth”  [8;  p.  267].  Regard- 
ing  the  interval,  Keynes  apparently  felt  that  it  had 
indeed  been  long  in  particular  historical  episodes- 
“quite  long  enough,”  he  said,  “to  include  (and,  per- 
haps  to  contrive)  the  rise  .  .  .  of  the  greatness  of  a 
nation”  [9;  p.  141].  In  this  connection  he  advanced 
the  hypothesis  that  the  early  industrialization  of 
England  and  France  had  been  powered  by  profit 
inflation.  “It  is  unthinkable,”  he  declared,  “that  the 
difference  between  the  amount  of  wealth  in  France 
and  England  in  1700  and  the  amount  in  1500  could 
ever  have  been  built  up  by  thrift  alone.  The  inter- 
vening  profit  inflation  which  created  the  modern 
world  was  surely  worth  while  if  we  take  the  long 
view”  [9;  p.  145]. 
Lest  one  wrongly  conclude  from  the  foregoing  that 
Keynes  of  the  Treatise  was  an  out-and-out  inflation- 
ist,  three  cautionary  observations  should  be  made. 
First,  he  was  referring  to  gently  rising  prices  and 
not  to  the  rapid  double-digit  inflation  that  is  unfortu- 
nately  so  common  today.  More  precisely,  he  was 
referring  to  slow  creeping  secular  inflation  of  no 
more  than  1 to  2  percent  per  year.  Today  such  mild 
inflation  would  be  viewed  as  constituting  virtual  price 
stability.  Second,  his  analysis  of  beneficial  inflation 
refers  chiefly  to  capital-poor  preindustrial  societies 
and  not  to  wealthy  modern  capitalist  economies.11 
Most  of  his  historical  examples  are  taken  from  the 
pre-capitalist  or  early-capitalist  era  when  western 
Europe  was  “very  poor  in  accumulated  wealth”  and 
“greatly  in  need  of  a  rapid  accumulation  of  capital” 
[9;  p.  145  and  8;  p.  268].  Under  these  conditions 
it  is  conceivable  that  slowly-creeping  profit  inflation 
might  indeed  have  spurred  industrialization  not  only 
by  diverting  resources  from  consumption  to  capital 
formation,  but  also  by  breaking  feudal  bonds,  stimu- 
lating  enterprise,  encouraging  market-oriented  ac- 
tivity,  and  widening  the  scope  of  the  market.  These 
latter  benefits,  however,  are  no  longer  available  to 
wealthy,  market-oriented  modern  capitalist  econo- 
mies  that  are  more  likely  to  find  secular  inflation  a 
curse  rather  than  a  blessing.  For  this  reason  Keynes 
refrained  from  recommending  even  slightly  inflation- 
ary  policies  for  modern  economies. 
Finally,  it  should  be  remembered  that  Keynes  was 
referring  to  profit  inflation  characterized  by  prices 
persistently  rising  faster  than  wages  and  not  to 
modern  inflations  in  which  wages  sometimes  rise 
ahead  of  prices  or  at  least  follow  them  without  delay 
thereby  wiping  out  the  profits  generated  by  the  price 
increases.12  As  previously  mentioned,  Keynes  held 
that  inflation  stimulates  growth  only  if  wages  lag 
substantially  behind  prices  leaving  a  large  and  per- 
sistent  margin  of  profit  to  finance  capital  formation. 
This  wage  lag,  however,  is  hardly  characteristic  of 
modern  inflations  in  which  wages  rise  swiftly  not 
only  to  restore  real  earnings  eroded  by  past  inflation 
but  also  to  protect  real  earnings  from  expected  future 
inflation.  The  clear  implication  is  that  Keynes  would 
have  opposed  these  modern  inflations,  which  accord- 
ing  to  his  analysis  are  income  rather  than  profit 
inflations. 
Accordingly,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Keynes,  at  the 
end  of  a  long  passage  extolling  the  historical  accom- 
plishments  of  profit  inflation,  nevertheless  declared, 
“I  am  not  yet  converted,  taking  everything  into  ac- 
11 On  this  point  see  Haberler  [2;  pp.  98-100]. 
12 See  Haberler  [2;  p.  99]. 
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whilst  avoiding  deflation  at  all  costs,  aims  at  the 
stability  of  purchasing  power  as  its  ideal  objective” 
[9;  p.  145].  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  he 
ever  changed  that  position.  On  the  contrary,.  there 
is  strong  evidence  that  he  remained  a  determined  foe 
of  inflation  and  an  adamant  proponent  of  price  sta- 
bility  even  to  the  extent  of  warning  of  the  potential 
danger  of  inflation  in  1937  when  the  unemployment 
rate  was  in  excess  of  10  percent  of  the  labor  force. 
Articles  in  The  Times  (1937) 
The  most  convincing  evidence  of  his  continuing 
strong  opposition  to  inflation  in  the  1930s  even  after 
the  publication  of  his  celebrated  General  Theory, 
appears  in  four  articles  he  wrote  for  The  Times  in 
early  1937.13  There,  in  discussing  policies  for  dealing 
with  unemployment  at  the  business  cycle  peak  of 
1937,  he  made  it  abundantly  clear  that  his  primary 
concern  was  preventing  inflation.  In  particular,  he 
argued  that  the  1937  unemployment  rate,  although 
very  high  (“indeed,  as  high  as  12½  percent”),  was 
nevertheless  at  its  minimum  noninflationary  level  at 
which  demand  pressure  must  be  curtailed  to  prevent 
inflation.  Accordingly,  he  recommended  a  sharp 
cutback  in  government  expenditure  on  the  grounds 
that  the  economy  was  rapidly  approaching  the  point 
where  further  increases  in  aggregate  demand  would 
be  purely  inflationary.  “I  believe,”  he  said,.  “that  we 
are  approaching,  or  have  reached,  the  point  where 
there  is  not  much  advantage  in  applying  a  further 
general  stimulus  at  the  centre”  [4;  pp.  11,  44,  65]. 
In  so  stating,  he  identified  the  noninflationary  full 
employment  rate  of  unemployment  (NIFERU) 
below  which  industrial  bottlenecks  frustrate  the  in- 
tended  output  and  employment  effects  of  aggregate 
demand  expansion  policy  so  that  mainly  prices  rise.14 
Beyond  that  point,  he  said,  noninflationary  reduc- 
tions  in  joblessness  could  only  be  achieved  by  specific 
structural  policies  designed  to  lower  the  full  employ- 
ment  rate  of  unemployment  itself. 
As  for  the  existing  high  level  of  that  unemployment 
rate,  he  attributed  it  to  structural  rigidities  in  the 
13 These  articles  are  reprinted  and  discussed  in  Hutchison 
[4].  Unless  otherwise  noted,  all  references  in  this  section 
are  to  Hutchison. 
14 The  NIFERU  concept  also  appears  in  the  General 
Theory  where  Keynes  asserts  that!  beyond  a  certain 
point,  structural  impediments  (“a  series  of  bottle-necks”) 
would  prevent  the  noninflationary  expansion  of  output 
and  employment  long  before  full  capacity  is  reached.  At 
the  bottleneck  point  any  further  increase  in  aggregate 
demand  would,  in  his  words,  largely  “spend  itself  in 
raising  prices,  as  distinct  from  employment”  [10;  pp. 
300-l]. 
British  economy,  in  particular  to  a  substantial  mis- 
match  between  the  location  and  skill  mix  of  the  labor 
force  and  the  location  and  composition  of  demand. 
As  he  put  it,  “the  economic  structure  is  unfortunately 
rigid”  and  this  rigidity  prevented  output  and  em- 
ployment  from  responding  to  increases  in  aggregate 
demand  so  that  only  prices  rise  [4;  pp.  11,  65-6]. 
It  follows,  he  said,  that  to  achieve  noninflationary 
reductions  in  unemployment  “we  are  more  in  need 
today  of  a  rightly  distributed  demand  than  of  a 
greater  aggregate  demand”  [4  ; pp.  11,  66].  In  other 
words,  noninflationary  reductions  in  unemployment 
cannot  be  obtained  by  expansionary  aggregate 
demand-management  policies  but  rather  “require  a 
different  technique”  [4;  pp.  11,  14,  44,  66].  To  this 
end  he  advocated  specific  structural  policies  to  reduce 
unemployment  on  the  grounds  that  noninflationary 
reductions  in  unemployment  could  only  be  achieved 
via  measures  that  eradicate  structural  rigidities  and 
lower  the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate  itself.  In 
so  arguing,  he  foreshadowed  by  30  years  the  modern 
monetarist  concept  of  the  natural  rate  of  unemploy- 
ment.15  He  also  refuted  the  popular  contention  that 
he  was  an  inflationist  who  advocated  full  employment 
at  any  cost.  That  is,  his  1937  articles  amply  demon- 
strate  that,  far  from  being  an  inflationist,  his  main 
consideration  was  preventing  inflation-even  at  a 
time  when  the  unemployment  rate  exceeded  12  per- 
cent.  The  same  articles  show  that,  far  from  advo- 
cating  full  employment  at  any  cost,  he  clearly  thought 
that  there  was  a  fairly  high  level  of  unemployment 
at  which  expansionary  aggregate  demand  policy 
should  be  curbed-  to  prevent  inflation.  From  that 
level  downward  he  insisted  that  unemployment  must 
be  dealt  with  not  by  the  general  expansion  of  aggre- 
gate  demand  but  rather  by  specific  structural  policies 
that  reduce  the  noninflationary  unemployment  rate 
itself.  In  short,  there  is  nothing  in  the  articles  to 
suggest  that  Keynes  had  ever  changed  his  mind  about 
inflation,  On  the  contrary,  he  shows  the  same  con- 
cern  for  inflation  in  his  1937  articles  that  he  earlier 
displayed  in  the  Tract. 
15 Hutchison  stresses  this  point,  arguing  that  Keynes 
“suggested  a  similar  concept  to  that  now  called-follow- 
inn  Professor  Milton  Friedman-a  ‘natural  rate’  of  un- 
employment  in  that  he  stressed  ‘the  unfortunately  rigid’ 
elements  in  the  British  economy  which  made  it  undesir- 
able  to  try  to  reduce  unemployment  further  by  the  ex- 
pansion  of  central  government  demand”  [4;  pp.  14-15]. 
Moreover,.  “Keynes’s  ‘different  technique’  .  .  .  corre- 
sponded,  in  some  important  respects,  with  what  today, 
following  Professor  Friedman,  is  described  as  reducing 
the  natural  rate  of  unemployment”  [4;  p.  46].  Similarly, 
Samuel  Brittan  writes  that  “Keynes’s  idea  of  the  level  of 
unemployment  which  would  exist  without  demand  defi- 
ciency  seems  astonishingly  similar  to  Milton  Friedman’s 
‘natural’  rate  of  unemployment”  [4;  p.  63,  n.  21]. 
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The  main  conclusion  of  this  essay  is  that  Keynes 
was  neither  the  subtle  inflationist  nor  the  extreme 
nonmonetarist  that  he  is  sometimes  depicted  as  being. 
On  the  contrary,  his  writings  reveal  that  he  con- 
sistently  deplored  inflation,  that  he  warned  unceas- 
ingly  of  its  dangers,  and  that  he  urged  that  its  avoid- 
ance  be  made  a  primary  objective  of  public  policy. 
In  these  respects  he  shared  much  with  modern  mone- 
tarists,  even  to  the  point  of  using  similar  analytical 
tools. 
In  that  perspective,  a  key  question  is  how  the  mis- 
conception  that  he  was  an  inflationist  could  have 
arisen.  Whether  it  stemmed  from  his  General 
Theory  (where  he  prescribed  deficit-spending  easy 
money  policies  to  eliminate  excessive  unemployment), 
or  from  the  tendency  of  some  self-styled  modern 
Keynesians  to  invoke  his  magic  name  in  behalf  of 
their  own  inflationary  full-employment  schemes,  or 
even  from  his  own  advocacy  of  discretion  over  rules 
in  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy,  his  reputation  as 
an  inflationist  is  highly  undeserved.  For,  with 
respect  to  the  General  Theory,  he  did  not  intend  for 
his  expansionist  policy  prescriptions  to  apply  to  in- 
flationary  situations.  On  the  contrary,  as  docu- 
mented  above,  he  abandoned  these  prescriptions  in 
early  1937  upon  the  first  signs  of  a  possible  inflation. 
Nor  would  he  have  had  anything  but  scorn  for 
modern  Keynesian  policies  designed  to  trade  off 
higher  inflation  for  lower  unemployment.  His  insis- 
tence  on  the  primacy  of  the  goal  of  absolute  price 
stability  would  have  been  in  direct  conflict  with  such 
inflationary  policies.  Finally,  his  support  of  dis- 
cretion  over  rules  did  not  reveal  an  inflationary  bias 
on  his  part  but  rather  a  belief  that  discretionary 
policy  was  necessary  to  compensate  changes  in  the 
demand  for  money  and  hence  to  achieve  price  level 
stability.  That  is,  he  differed  from  the  proponents  of 
monetary  rules  not  over  the  objective  of  price  sta- 
bility  per  se,  but  rather  over  the  means  to  achieve 
that  objective.  There  is  nothing  in  his  writings  to 
indicate  that  he  equated  proper  discretionary  policy 
with  the  use  of  price  inflation  to  expand  output  and 
employment.  On  the  contrary,  he  thought  that  dis- 
cretionary  policy  offered  the  best  means  of  avoiding 
inflation  and  achieving  price  stability.  In  short, 
given  his  beliefs  about  the  efficacy  of  discretionary 
policy,  his  advocacy  of  such  policy  was  perfectly 
consistent  with  his  antipathy  to  inflation.  That  anti- 
pathy  amply  justifies  F.  A.  Hayek’s  judgment  that  if 
Keynes  were  alive  today  he  would  be  “one  of  the 
most  determined  fighters  against  inflation”  [4;  p.  40, 
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